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Abstract 
The caste system has dominated the social, political and economic lives of Indian people for over three thousand 
years. Since independence, the Indian government has introduced a flood of quotas, schemes and affirmative 
action to tackle caste discrimination. Can seventy years of government policy reverse three thousand years of 
oppression? Taking a close look at the country's credit system reveals that a new, more subtle, and less overt 
form of discrimination appears to be emerging, and becoming more widespread. This paper examines whether 
caste-based differences influence the amount of credit sanctioned to borrowers in India utilising data from the 
India Human Development Survey collected in 2005 and 2011-12. Using the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition 
method, along with the Heckman procedure and the instrumental variable approach to correct for selection and 
simultaneity bias, I find substantial credit differentials between the general caste and other lower castes. I also 
show the evidence of caste discrimination against the lower castes. The results of this research have been 
complemented by qualitative data gathered from interviewing lower caste borrowers in North India to 
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Discrimination based on caste is a well-established phenomenon in India. Not that long ago, 
lower caste people were treated as untouchable, were consistently denied access to public 
services, and were subject to exploitation, abuse, mistreatment and prejudice. Nowadays, the 
scale and visibility have changed, but discrimination can still be seen in the form of relatively 
subtle constraints and restrictions in different areas: education, housing, finance, and 
employment. Although caste equality has been enshrined in the Indian constitution since 
1950, caste-based divisions have continued to dominate - in the economy (Deshpande, 2000; 
Kijima, 2006), in marriage (Ahuja and Ostermann, 2016), in employment (Agrawal, 2014; 
Thorat and Attewell, 2007), in access to energy (Saxena and Bhattacharya, 2018), in 
education (Desai and Kulkarni, 2008) and in general social interaction. These caste divisions 
are sometimes reinforced through economic boycotts and physical violence (Narula, 1999; 
Thorat, 2005). Despite various efforts by the government such as reservation policies in 
educational institutions, and employment in the government and public sector, caste still 
remains an important indicator of socioeconomic disadvantage (Kumar, 2016). Given the 
pervasive presence of discrimination, it would be surprising if it did not have a significant 
influence on credit outcomes. 
 
Credit is one of the most critical constraints in economic development for the lower castes 
(Thorat, 2009). Variations in access to credit constitute a major source of income inequality 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). Previous research has shown that a lack of access to 
credit constraints entrepreneurship (Banerjee, Breza, Duflo and Kinnan, 2012), poverty 
reduction (Chowdhury, Ghosh and Wright, 2005), agricultural investment, and income 
growth (Kaboski and Townsend, 2012), farm production (Kochar, 1997), and spending on 
education (Doan, Gibson, and Holmes, 2004). These constraints are even higher for lower 
caste groups who remain socially excluded from the mainstream and lack access to assets, 
public facilities and opportunities to improve their plight (Thorat and Neuman, 2012).  
 
I use the definition of discrimination proposed by Becker (1971) which states that 
discrimination occurs when some individuals complete a market transaction at a higher cost 
or under more stringent terms than others who share the same characteristics. In credit 
markets, this translates into differences in loan outcome (approvals, amount, and interest rate) 
which are based on differences in caste, race, or nationality between groups with otherwise 
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similar human and physical capital. Becker introduced the first model of discrimination 
which explains discrimination by ‘taste for discrimination’. When applied to credit markets, 
this model implies that lenders may discriminate against minority borrowers to avoid 
interacting with them, regardless of the borrower’s ability to repay, and that they are willing 
to suffer a financial penalty to do so. Another theory of discrimination, known as ‘statistical 
discrimination’ was pioneered by Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972). The premise of this 
model - when applied to lending - is that the lenders have limited information about the 
circumstances of some borrowers - particularly their ability to repay. This gives lenders an 
incentive to use easily observable characteristics such as caste to assume the expected 
creditworthiness of borrowers provided that these characteristics are correlated with 
creditworthiness. 
 
The reasons for credit differentials between castes may originate on both the supply and 
demand sides of the credit market. On the supply side, some lenders may treat a loan 
application differently based on whether it comes from a higher caste or a lower caste, 
notwithstanding similar economic, household, and personal characteristics of the borrower - 
simply because of preferences or cultural beliefs about castes. Other lenders may discriminate 
against lower caste borrowers due to an expectation that lower caste clients lack the business 
acumen to use a loan investment wisely. On the demand side, lower caste borrowers may 
demonstrate traits such as a cultural reluctance to display entrepreneurship or initiative; a lack 
of background in negotiation, or a cautious attitude to risk-taking - all of which could affect a 
loan application. It could also be that a self-fulfilling prophecy was at work: the borrowers 
themselves anticipated prejudice, felt that the lender would be unfair to them (high-interest 
rates and unfair collateral requirements), and hence, did not seek large loans. 
 
The qualitative interviews with lower caste borrowers in Northern India demonstrate 
that modern-day discrimination is rarely in the overt form of denying all loans to the lower 
castes. More subtle means are used: for example, giving a smaller loan amount, demanding 
higher collateral, granting inadequate extensions on late repayment, imposing higher interest 
rates, or denying marginal applications. The qualitative enquiries find evidence of petty 
discrimination to discourage borrowers: long waiting times for opening bank accounts, lack 
of help with the completion of paperwork, and intimidating inter-personal contact between 




One lower caste entrepreneur expressed his views on business lending from banks: 
“….bank lending is not for the poor lower caste businesses. The banks never give us an 
adequate loan. And it takes many weeks just to start the loan process - they give priority to 
the higher castes.” 
 
Another lower caste borrowers added about his experience in the informal credit market: 
“….the loan terms are unfair to us. We get less loan for the same amount and quality of 
land for collateral compared to upper caste. Lenders always treat it like they are doing us a 
favour even though we pay such a high-interest rate” 
 
The issue of caste discrimination in credit has largely been ignored in social science 
research in India. We, therefore, have limited insight on the extent and nature of caste 
discrimination in credit associated with group identity. This is one of the first studies to 
analyse the discrimination against lower castes in India in the credit framework using 
qualitative and decomposition methods.  
 
Using nationally representative data from the India Human Development Survey 
(IHDS) collected in 2005 and 2011-12 and qualitative interviews with lower caste borrowers, 
this paper examines and compares loan amount differentials between castes in the Indian 
credit sector over two periods. Using Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition, I demonstrate to what 
extent these differences can be ‘explained’ due to the differences in observable characteristics 
of the individuals and how much is ‘unexplained’ - which represents an indication of 
discrimination. I further decompose the 'explained' component to identify the contribution of 
each specific characteristic in generating the credit differences. In addition, I use the quantile 
decomposition technique to analyse the caste gap across the entire credit distribution. 
Furthermore, I compare the credit outcomes – loan application, approval rate and credit 
amount sanctioned – in lending from banks, money lenders and social networks. 
 
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that there are genuine statistical differences 
between castes which affect loan outcomes, regardless of discrimination. There are particular 
differences in observable characteristics between the general caste (GC) and lower castes - 
Other Backward Castes (OBC); Schedule Castes (SC); and Schedule Tribes (ST).  The 
former is more urban, better educated, more likely to be self-employed or in regular salaried 
jobs, have higher income and consumption levels. These disparities inevitably get reflected in 
 
 5 
the amount of credit sanctioned - such that lower castes on average perform significantly 
poorly compared to general castes. The differences, however, in the credit amount between 
the general caste and other lower castes in India are not only because of lower quality 
attributes of lower caste (in terms of education, income, assets etc) but also because these 
groups may be facing discrimination in the credit sector. 
 
The findings show three main results. First, there are significant differences in loan 
amount between the general caste and other lower castes, and a portion of these differences 
remains unexplained. Second, the credit differentials have decreased between 2005 and 2011-
12. Third, loan application and approval rates vary according to caste and lender. Generally, 
lower castes have a higher loan application and approval rate in lending from informal sector 
while general caste has a higher loan application and approval from banks. 
 
Another contribution of this paper is highlighting the sticky floor2 and glass ceiling3 
phenomenon in the credit gaps between the general caste and other lower castes. Using the 
quantile regression-based decomposition method, I find that the credit gap between the 
general caste and other lower castes varies across the credit distribution. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 draws on literature to give the background 
of the Indian caste system. Section 3 presents data and uses descriptive evidence to highlight 
caste differences in India. Section 4 sets out the methodology for the paper. Section 5 
presents the results from the selection equation, loan amount equation, decomposition of 
credit differentials. Section 6 discusses and concludes the paper.  
2. Background of the caste system in India 
The Indian Constitution identifies three main categories of people for preferential policies 
that reserve seats in legislatures, public sector enterprises, government jobs, and educational 
institutions. These are OBC; SC also known as Dalits; and ST also known as Adivasis. GC 
(also known as forward class) is a term used in India to classify communities who do not 
 
2Sticky floor refers to the scenario where the gap is higher at the bottom of the distribution and the lower caste 
at the bottom are at a great disadvantage. In this particular case, it refers to the phenomenon of social rigidity in 
which a certain group of lower castes fail to or are unable to take advantage of readily available options for 
improving their social and economic status.  
3 Glass ceiling refers to the scenario where the gap is higher at the top of the distribution and the lower caste at 
the top at a great disadvantage. 
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qualify for any affirmative action schemes operated by the Indian government. By default, 
'general caste’ equates to the higher caste in more traditional categorisations. 
 
In India, caste is associated with socio-economic status with a close relationship with 
occupation and employment (Thorat and Attewell, 2007), income and expenditure 
(Deshpande, 2000), and capital (Kijima, 2006) - all which are of course helpful in accessing 
new lines of credit. General caste groups usually have better economic outcomes than lower 
castes. There is a great hierarchy among the OBC and generally, many OBC groups are 
closer to GC than to SC or ST in terms of standard of living, income, education and other 
characteristics. The SC, ST and OBC comprise about 19.5 percent, 8.6 percent, and 41 
percent, respectively, of India's population (National Sample Survey Office, 2011). But seven 
decades after Independence, 33.6 percent of SC, 44.8 percent of ST and 20.7 percent of OBC 
live below poverty line. 
Table 1:  Caste distribution according to population, poverty, expenditure and literacy 















General Castes 25 12.5 1281 2467 79% 
Scheduled Castes 19.5 33.6 929 1444 58% 
Scheduled Tribes 8.6 44.8 873 1797 50% 
Other Backward 
Classes 
41.1 20.7 1036 1679 69% 
Source: National Sample Survey Office, 2011. 1 Dollar = Rs 70 in May 2019 
Dalits are the most oppressed and marginalised group in India. While Dalits make up 
around 20% of the total population of India, their control over resources of the country is less 
than 5% (National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) report, 2009). 
Approximately three-quarters of the Dalit workforce are landless or nearly landless 
agricultural labourers (Census of India, 2011). According to an NCHDR report, the social 
conditions of Dalits are so deplorable that more than half of the Dalit children are 
malnourished and less than 10% of Dalit households can afford electricity, safe drinking 
water, and toilets.  
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The condition of ST households is no better than their SC counterparts. Even though 
ST did not face exclusion in the form of untouchability, unlike SC, they have even poorer 
outcomes in terms of health, education, jobs, and employment. Despite the reservation 
system, the share of SC and ST in government jobs is 16.99% and 8.55 % respectively 
(Census, 2011). On the whole, lower castes especially SC and ST perform badly in every 
development metric - including credit. 
3. Data and sample characteristics 
The data used in the paper comes from two rounds of the India Human Development Survey 
(IHDS) - a nationally representative survey of 42,152 households in 2011-12 and 41,554 
households in 2005 collected from 1,503 villages and 971 urban neighbourhoods across 
India. The survey covers a range of questions relating to economic activity, income and 
consumption expenditure, assets, social capital, education, health, marriage, and fertility. 
Realising that quantitative secondary data is insufficient to capture most of the social reality 
of discrimination, this study also makes use of qualitative data using semi-structured 
interviews and informal discussions with several borrowers in three villages4 in North India 
to understand the way caste discrimination exists in the credit sector. 16 men (3 from OBC, 
12 from SC, and 1 from ST) and 8 (6 from SC and 2 from ST) women from lower caste 
communities were randomly selected for the interviews5. The interviews followed a semi-
structured approach, giving participants the flexibility to discuss issues important to them. 
Informal discussions were held with political activists and representative of Dalit 
communities, four junior employees of two rural commercial banks6 (3 GC and 1 OBC) and 
six local money lenders (belonging to general caste) operating in the region.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive of the variables of the four caste groups used in the 
analysis. The proportion of caste groups used in IHDS 2011-12 is similar to National Sample 
Survey Office (2006) where GC are 30 percent, OBC are 41.1, ST are 8.6 percent, SC are 
 
4 The qualitative work was done in the months of January and February in 2018. The villages demographic are 
representative of the states in the North India, however, it’s difficult to say that it represents nationwide trends 
since India is such a diverse country. The qualitative analysis are very much in line with the quantitative 
analysis. 
5 All the clients approached agreed to be interviewed for this study. The interviews were done with women at 
their houses in the presence of a local social worker who helped with translation and conversations. Consent was 
taken in verbal form.  
6 Punjab National Bank and State Bank of India. 
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19.5 percent. The primary dependent variable is the log of loan amount7.  GC has the highest 
amount of loan undertaken, followed by OBC, SC and ST. However, only 46 percent of the 
GC participated in the credit market compared to 60 percent of the OBC, 44 percent of the 
ST and 56 percent of the SC in 2011-12. Similar trends can be seen in 2005. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics  
Variables description 2011-2012 2005 
 GC OBC ST SC GC OBC ST SC 
Proportion in the sample 28.57 41.10 8.78 21.74 32.48 39.19 8.28 20.05   
 
Loan Details: 
        
Loan amount (Rs) 64410 52949 24611 28483 24323 18748 7390 10970 
Log of Loan 10.72 10.39 9.60 9.94 10.03 9.56 8.67 9.14 
Dummy if loan taken 0.46 0.60 0.44 0.56 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.44 
Number of loans taken 1.23 1.87 1.57 1.66 0.96 1.45 1.00 1.42 
         
Household Characteristics:         
Yearly income (Rs) 178309 114354 92998 99492 75420 47279 39268 38676 
Yearly consumption (Rs) 148916 114919 83397 94903 68829 49863 32724 43027 
Proportion have female 
head 
0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 .09 .09 .10 .10 
Age of the head 51.88 49.53 47.92 47.83 48.51 47.09 45.53 45.46 
Education years of the 
head 
7.45 5.46 3.91 4.39 7.30 5.22 3.63 3.99 
Size of the Household 4.82 4.92 4.77 4.83 5.12 5.28 5.06 5.19 
Amount of land in acres 11.94 11.60 16.52 4.78 22.28 12.97 15.54 3.42 
Dummy if own land  0.46 0.46 0.59 0.35 0.41 0.45 0.55 0.33 
Dummy if live in urban 
area 
0.44 0.35 0.14 0.30 0.47 0.34 0.15 0.29 
House Quality8 0.75 0.66 0.35 0.55 0.71 0.57 0.29 0.46 
Dummy if have a ration 
card9 
0.87 0.87 0.81 0.86 0.85 0.80 0.78 0.86 
Market price of rice per 
kg 
23.82 21.64 18.87 20.91 13.06 11.69 10.61 11.59 
 
The general caste has better outcomes in terms of loan amount, income, consumption, and 
education compared to the other castes. Income, consumption and loan amount increased by 
 
7 Government policies have invariably seek to tackle the discrimination problem in the credit market by 
focusing on the access to credit. The assumption is that - having gained access to credit market - the processes 
and controls within that system will work to ensure equal treatment. This study does not focus on access, 
instead, it measures how equitably the credit system treats different groups after they have gained access. 
8 A binary variable distinguishing between dwellings that are designed to be solid and include cemented flooring 
and strong roof compare to houses without a strong floor or roof. (Good = 1, Bad = 0). 
9 Ration card is an identification document issued by state governments in India. It categorises household 
according to their poverty level and allow the holder of below and extreme poverty households to obtain food 
and other commodities at a subsidised price. 
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more than double for all the castes between 2005 and 2012. Caste-based stratification 
translates into low human capital for lower caste individuals. In 2005, the average number of 
education years completed by  ST (head of the households) in the sample were 3.63 years, 
3.99 years for SC, 5.22 years for OBC, followed by 7.30 years for the GC. Generally, the 
differences at lower levels of education (primary) are less pronounced across social groups 
but start to diverge widely by middle school and higher. For instance, only 3.5 percent of the 
SC heads of household have achieved a graduate or post-graduate education compared to 14 
percent of GC individuals. 
 
Although the GC are less likely to live in rural areas, they are more likely to own land 
for agricultural purposes. In 2011-12, 56 percent of GC lived in the rural area, and 46 percent 
owns land for agricultural purposes. Whereas 65 percent of OBC, 86 percent of ST and 70 
percent of SC population live in the rural area, however, 46 of OBC, 59 percent of ST, and 35 
percent of SC own land for agricultural purposes. The amount of land owned by SC/ST has 
increased, while decreased for OBC and GC over this time. The general castes are more 
likely to live in dwellings that are designed to be solid and include cemented flooring and 
strong roof (also known as pukka houses). 
 
The proportion of those taking a loan has also increased for all the groups. GC has 
taken the lowest number of loans in the last five years; however, their loan amount is twice as 
big as SC. However, SC/ST have significantly improved their credit outcomes between 2005 
and 2011-12. Figure 1 below plots the kernel density distribution of log loan for all the 





Figure 1: The kernel density distribution of log of amount of loan by various caste groups in 2011-2012 and 
2005. 
 
There is a clear distinction in the occupational structure of various castes (see Table 6 
in the Appendix). The major source of income for GC and OBC continued to be cultivation, 
non-agricultural wage labour and salaried employment. Since a large proportion of ST own 
land, a very significant portion of this caste group derives their income from agricultural 
activities. The hierarchical nature of the caste system combined with low endowments of 
human and physical capital implies that major portion of SC’s income continues to come 
from selling their labour and a very small portion derives from cultivation.  
 
The purpose of loans taken varies according to the caste group (see Table 7 in the 
Appendix). In 2011, around 36.5 percent of the general caste loans are for productive 
purposes such as buying land, agricultural, business, and education and the rest for non-
productive purposes such as marriage, consumption, educational, medical expenses etc. 
Around a third of the loans by ST and OBC are for productive purposes which are in line 
with GC. SC mostly comprising of wage labour has only 21 percent of loans for productive 
purposes and mostly take loans for non-productive purposes.  
 
Compared to 2005, the patterns within the group are more or less the same. Loan for 
the non-productive purposes has increased for all the caste groups. Since consumption loans 
do not generate any financial return and are deemed risky, increase in such loans for GCs and 
OBC shows that lenders favour these castes over SC and ST. Loans for productive purposes 
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such as agriculture and business decreased for all lower castes but the decline in the SC was 
the sharpest where it reduced to half. 
 
Different castes tend to get their loans from different sources (see Table 8 in the 
Appendix). The major source of finance for general castes comes from formal lenders such as 
banks, while social networks and money lenders also play a significant role. OBC have 
increased their share of lending from banks while reducing their reliance on money lenders 
between 2005 and 2011-12. SC and ST are majorly dependent on informal sources for their 
finance, however, these groups have greatly reduced their dependence on money lenders 
between 2005 and 2011-12. 
 
With the development of formal finance in India in the last decade, all the caste groups 
have increased their reliance on formal sources such as banks, NGOs and credit groups in 
2011-12. With further development in financial services in India specially in microfinance 
and rural banking, we may see a current trend of a diminishing role for money lenders in 
Indian society. The data also show an increase in the share of loans from relatives and friends 
for all the caste groups. Overall, we see a significant convergence of education, income, 
consumption, loan amount of SC/STs toward non-SC/ST levels (also noted by Hnatkovska, 
Lahiri and Paul, 2012). 
 
The survey done in 2011-2012 also has information on the breakdown of loan approval 
and rejection of households from banks, money lenders, and social network (see Table 9 in 
the Appendix). There is no clear pattern, however, general castes are more likely to borrow 
from banks, whereas other castes are more likely to borrow from informal sources such as 
money lenders and friends.  
4. Methodology 
This paper presents estimates of the mean caste loan amount gap in the Indian credit sector 
and the extent to which this differential can be explained by differences in observable 
characteristics or ‘endowments’ of clients across caste groups. The amount of credit the 
borrower has arises from the following equation: 
 




Where is the natural logarithm of loan amount of ith individual in jth social group ranging 
from GC, SC, ST and OBC.   is a vector of observed characters, and  is a coefficient 
vector to be estimated for each caste type, and  is assumed to be a normally distributed 
error term with mean zero and positive variance. 
 
The Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition is employed to decompose the credit amount gap 
in outcomes between various castes10. Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) developed a 
regression-based decomposition to divide the gap in an outcome of interest between two 
groups into an ‘explained’ and an ‘unexplained’ portion. The ‘explained’ portion of the gap is 
the actual difference between the mean values of two castes which could be explained by 
differences in endowments and personal attributes. The ‘unexplained’ portion of the gap 
arises from group differences in the effects of the independent variables (Sen, 2014). This is 
also known as discrimination function or unexplained residual – a part that cannot be 
accounted for by differences in characteristics. While the unexplained component is often 
used as a measure for discrimination, it is very likely that the residual also includes the 
effects of unobservable or unmeasurable characteristics (Deshpande and Sharma, 2014). All 
decomposition analyses are subject to this caveat given that it is generally very difficult to 
control for all the borrower’s characteristics that may affect creditworthiness11.  
The difference in the credit amount arise from following equation: 
                (2) 
                                     EXPLAINED                    UNEXPLAINED 
Where  is the natural logarithm of loan amount, g and l subscripts stand for general 
caste and lower castes (SC, ST and OBC) respectively.   is a vector of observed characters 
for general caste,  is a vector of observed characters for various lower castes, and  is a 
coefficient vector to be estimated for general caste,  is a coefficient vector to be estimated 
for lower caste and is the estimate of the non-discriminatory credit coefficient and can be 
written as: 
 
10 Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition has been used to measure differences between castes in health outcomes 
(Maity, 2018), labour market (Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Paul, 2012), poverty (Borooah, 2005), school enrolment 
(Borooah and Iyer, 2005), access to energy (Saxena and Bhattacharya, 2018) in Indian context.  
11 It is also possible that pre-market discrimination affects the development of characteristics, and thus, the 
explained component could also constitute the effects of past discrimination. Considering this, the estimates of 
the unexplained components should not be taken as precise measurement of discrimination but as rough 





The non-discriminatory credit coefficient , can be estimated using the coefficients 
from the higher caste where (D=1) or the lower caste as the reference coefficients (D=0). 
However, there is no particular reason to assume that the coefficients of any of the groups are 
non-discriminating (Jann, 2008). It has been claimed that the undervaluation of one group 
comes along with an overvaluation of the other (Cotton, 1988). Considering this, I use the 
method proposed by Neumark (1988) using the coefficients from a pooled regression over 
both groups as an estimate for  
a. Selectivity and simultaneity bias 
Another methodological problem faced in analysing the caste gap is the existence of 
endogeneity which can be caused by self-selection and simultaneity bias. Selection bias could 
occur when individuals with similar characteristics (education, assets or consumption level) 
have different levels of entrepreneurship, perseverance and ability, which may lead to 
different probabilities of their participating in the credit market. The self-selection is 
corrected by using the Heckman two-step procedure in the analysis. 
Using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the observed earnings differential can be further 
decomposed into: 
         (3) 
                                                EXPLAINED                     UNEXPLAINED             
where  is the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio ( ).  
Simultaneity bias could be caused by the presence of endogenous variable such as 
consumption expenditure which may cause reverse causality. To remove the simultaneity 
bias, we require an instrument for consumption expenditure – an exogenous variable that is 
correlated with consumption expenditure but is not otherwise associated with the loan 
amount. In this case, the market price of one-kilogram rice in the region satisfies the 
requirement for use as an instrumental variable12.  Rice is the most consumed food in India, 
 
12 We also test for the relevance of the instrument in the first-stage regression. Staiger and Stock (1997) 
proposed a rule of thumb declaring the instruments weak when the first stage F-statistic is less than 10. The F-
statistic from the first-stage is sufficiently large in every instance, suggesting that the IV is powerful (see Table 
3 in the online appendix). Another approach, by Stock and Yogo (2005) is to reject the null hypothesis of weak 
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and its price has a significant impact on consumption expenditure. The instrument affects the 
loan amount through its effect on consumption expenditure only.  
b. Specification checks 
Identification can be achieved by including at least one independent variable that appears in 
the selection equation but not in the outcome equation - we need a variable that affects the 
selection, but not the outcome (Sartori, 2003). In the specification, there are a number of 
additional identifying restrictions that are described below.  
 
Landownership can affect a household’s ability to participate in the credit market as 
land can be used as collateral, therefore, it appears in the selection model. However, merely 
having land does not affect the amount of loan a borrower can get and other variables such as 
size of landholding, quality of land or land titles may be more suitable in the credit amount 
equation. To check this, I plugged the landownership dummy in the credit amount equation 
and found it does not have any effect on the amount of loan, whereas it positively affects the 
probability of participation in credit market. The information regarding the source of loan and 
purpose of the loan is only available for people who have taken loan, so it appears in the 
credit amount equation. The rest of the variables appears in both selection and loan amount 
model. 
5. Results 
a. Selection equation 
I begin the analysis by estimating a model of the probability of participating in the credit 
market using a probit model13. The dependent variable is 1 if the client has taken a loan or 0 
otherwise. The estimates of the probit regressions are used to construct the Inverse Mills 
Ratio (IMR) for the purpose of correcting the credit amount equation for selection bias as 
reported in the later section.  
To facilitate the understanding of the effects of coefficients, I present the marginal 
effects of the regressors on the probability of participation in the credit market by each caste 
 
instruments when the Cragg and Donald (1993) F-statistic exceeds a given threshold. In this case, we reject the 
null hypotheses of the weak instrument since Cragg-Donald F statistic exceeds the threshold of 16.38 at 10%. 
By these criteria, we have a good instrument in the average market price of one kilogram rice in the region.  
 
13 I failed to reject the null hypothesis for Wald Test of exogeneity using instrument variable, therefore, a 
regular probit regression may be appropriate.  
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in Tables 10 and 11 in the Appendix14. The results from both time periods show similar 
results. One percent increase in consumption increases the probability of taking a loan by 0.1 
percent for GC, 0.14 percent for OBC, 0.17 percent for ST and 0.15 percent for SC in 2005 
and 0.11 percent for GC, 0.13 percent for OBC, 0.11 percent for ST and 0.14 percent for SC 
in 2011-2012. The results show that gender exerts an influence on taking a loan. Being a 
female significantly decreases the probability of taking a loan (except for ST in 2005). The 
number of education years completed by the head of the households shows a negative 
relationship with the likelihood of participating in the credit market (except for ST in 2011-
12). This implies that highly educated heads are more likely to work in salaried positions and 
may not require loans.  The land ownership has a positive relationship with the probability of 
participation in credit markets. Households living in a strong and permanent dwelling are less 
likely to participate in the credit markets (except for SC in 2005 and ST in 2011-12). 
Households living in rural areas are more likely to participate in the credit market (except for 
ST in 2011-12) reflecting the cyclical nature of an agricultural economy and the relatively 
long delay between investment and income. To account for the differences between the 
sources of income and location, I also controlled for occupation and states dummies. 
b. Loan amount equation 
I now proceed to estimate regressions for each caste type corrected for selection and 
endogeneity (see Tables 14 and 15 in the Appendix). The result shows that a single 
percentage increase in consumption increases the loan amount by 0.68 percent for GC, 0.84 
percent for OBC, 1.257 percent for ST and 0.31 percent for SC in 2005 and 0.80 for GC, 0.48 
percent for OBC, 0.52 percent for SC, however, no effect for ST in 2011-12. Education has a 
positive relationship with the loan amount. An additional year of education significantly 
increases the amount of loan taken by all the castes except for ST in 2005. Age has a 
quadratic relationship with the volume of loans implying that lenders are more inclined to 
give higher loans to older borrowers (except for SC in 2005). The size of landholding has a 
negative relationship with loan amount. This could be due to the following reasons. First, in 
the absence of land titles, and poorly administered land records, small and marginal farmers, 
who account for more than half of the total land holding, may not be able to use it as  
collateral (Reserve Bank of India, 2015). Second, the cost of cultivation per unit of land 
might decrease with an increase in the size of the land under cultivation (Bhattacharjee & 
 




Rajeev, 2014). Third, it’s a non-liquid and immovable asset so it’s not very suitable for 
collateral, specially for short term loan for small and marginal farmers. An alternative such as 
gold rather than land is preferred by the lenders (Sarap, 1991). The quality of borrower’s 
house is a better predictor of loan amount and significantly increases the loan amount (except 
for ST in 2005). Having a female head of the household and living in urban area increases the 
loan amount for every caste except for ST in 2005. The estimated models have fairly high 
explanatory power for all four social groups. 
c. Decomposing the differences in participation in the credit market: 
To disentangle the role of observable and unobservable factors on the participation level in 
the credit market among various castes, I extend the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to 
nonlinear methods using Fairlie’s (2005) approach. Table 3 below decompose the probability 
of participation in the credit market into explained and unexplained part using the estimates 
from the selection equation. 
Table 3: Decomposition of the probability of participation in the credit market in 2005 & 
2011. 
 2005 2011-12 
VARIABLES GC VS 
OBC 
GC VS ST GC VS SC GC VS 
OBC 
GC VS ST GC VS SC 
       
GC 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.458*** 0.458*** 0.458*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Others 0.469*** 0.337*** 0.440*** 0.600*** 0.440*** 0.565*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
Difference -0.139*** -0.007 -0.109*** -0.142*** 0.017* -0.107*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Explained -0.132*** -0.040*** -0.066*** -0.109*** -0.031*** -0.052*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
Unexplained -0.007 0.033*** -0.044*** -0.032*** 0.048*** -0.055*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) 
       
Observations 29,714 16,877 21,765 28,444 15,270 20,491 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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For the data collected in 2005, I find that all the lower castes have a higher probability 
of participating in the credit market compared to the general caste. In 2011-12, I find that the 
SC and OBC have a higher probability of participation in the credit market compared to GC 
whereas GC has a small advantage over ST. A considerable proportion of the gap between 
GC and SC (40 percent in 2005 and 51 percent in 2011-12) remains unexplained. The 
difference between probability of participation between GC and OBC can largely be 
explained by characteristics and attributes. A positive unexplained component between GC 
and ST (45 percent in 2005 and 60 percent in 2011) implies that GC got better return from 
their characteristics. On average, lower castes are more likely to participate in the credit 
market compared to general castes after controlling for the selection variables. 
 
 
Figure 2: Decomposition of the probability of participation in the credit market. The figure is based on Table 3 




d. Decomposing credit differential with the selection effect 
Tables 4 and 5 present the decomposition of the log credit amount differentials between 
the general caste and all other castes into explained and unexplained component.  

























VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs OBC     GC vs ST GC vs ST  GC vs SC  SC vs GC 
       
GC 10.025*** 12.368*** 10.025*** 12.368*** 10.025*** 12.368*** 
 (0.022) (0.125) (0.022) (0.125) (0.022) (0.125) 
Others 9.555*** 11.278*** 8.667*** 10.213*** 9.140*** 10.695*** 
 (0.016) (0.074) (0.047) (0.175) (0.023) (0.096) 
Difference 0.470*** 1.090*** 1.358*** 2.155*** 0.885*** 1.673*** 
 (0.027) (0.146) (0.052) (0.215) (0.032) (0.158) 
Explained 0.470*** 0.878*** 1.213*** 1.405*** 0.811*** 0.948*** 
 (0.021) (0.031) (0.051) (0.059) (0.028) (0.034) 
Unexplained 0.000 0.212 0.140*** 0.751*** 0.073*** 0.725*** 
 (0.023) (0.143) (0.050) (0.213) (0.029) (0.155) 
       
Observations 12,076 12,077 5,600 5,600 8,105 8,105 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows decomposition of log of 
loan into explained and unexplained portion. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show results from equation 2. Columns 2, 4 
and 6 show results from equation 3 and are corrected for selection and endogeneity. 
 

























VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs OBC     GC vs 
ST 
GC vs ST  GC vs SC  SC vs GC 
       
GC 10.723*** 13.210*** 10.723*** 13.210*** 10.723*** 13.210*** 
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 (0.020) (0.108) (0.020) (0.108) (0.020) (0.108) 
Others 10.386*** 12.130*** 9.593*** 11.614*** 9.945*** 11.801*** 
 (0.014) (0.059) (0.042) (0.191) (0.019) (0.084) 
Difference 0.337*** 1.081*** 1.130*** 1.597*** 0.778*** 1.409*** 
 (0.025) (0.124) (0.047) (0.219) (0.028) (0.137) 
Explained 0.305*** 0.726*** 1.02*** 1.241*** 0.649*** 0.784*** 
 (0.016) (0.027) (0.046) (0.051) (0.025) (0.029) 
Unexplained 0.031*** 0.355*** 0.103*** 0.355 0.128*** 0.625*** 
 (0.002) (0.122) (0.045) (0.218) (0.025) (0.135) 
       
Observations 15,328 15,349 6,887 6,897 10,268 10,283 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the decomposition of 
log of loan into explained and unexplained portion. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show results from equation 2. Columns 
2, 4 and 6 show results from equation 3 and are corrected for selection and endogeneity. 
 
Consistent with earlier results, I find that GC is in a more favourable position in the 
Indian credit sector. The observed credit differentials show that the GC has 47 percent 
advantage over OBC, 135.8 percent over ST, and 88.5 percent over SC in 2005 and 33.7 
percent advantage over OBC, 113 percent over ST, and 77.8 percent over SC in 2011-12 (see 
observed credit differentials in Columns 1, 3 and 4 in Tables 4 and 5). Largely these 
differences can be explained by the endowments and personal characteristics, and a very 
small portion remains unexplained. 
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  Figure 3: Credit differential between the general caste and other lower castes for 2005 and 2011-12. The figure 
is based on columns 2, 4 and 6 of Tables 4 and 5 comparing caste inequalities between various castes in 2005 
and 2011-12. 
 
However, these results should be treated with caution due to self-selection in the credit 
market. The adjusted credit differentials in Tables 4 and 5 show that decomposition results 
are sensitive to the selection effect. The credit differentials are underestimated without the 
correction for selectivity. The adjusted credit differential increases to 109 percent for OBC, 
215.5 percent for ST, and 167.3 percent for SC in 2005, and 108 percent for OBC, increases 
to 159.7 percent for ST, and 140.9 percent for SC in 2011-12. The credit differentials are 
largely explained by the differences in endowments and personal characteristics. Out of the 
total differences, 19 percent between GC and OBC, 35 percent between GC and ST and 43 
percent between GC and SC remains unexplained in 2005; and 32 percent between GC and 
OBC, 22 percent between GC and ST and 44 percent between GC and SC remains 
unexplained in 2011. The credit differentials have decreased between the general caste and 
other lower castes compared to 2005. 
Now I will discuss the factors that will explain these sharp differences. Table 16 in the 
appendix shows the variable decomposition of credit differential. 
 
 21 
In 2005, the differences in consumption expenditure is responsible for 28 percent of the 
explained share of the total difference between GC and OBC. The differences in states 
contribute to 38 percent, and the differences in source of the loan, purpose of the loan and 
occupations contribute to 16 percent, and the differences in years of education, age and 
quality of the house explain the rest. Similarly, 42 percent of the explained portion of the 
credit differences between GC and ST in 2005 arise from the differences in consumption 
expenditure; source of the loan, purpose of the loan and occupations explain 19 percent; 
differences in states contributes to 12 percent and differences in years of education, age and 
quality of the house explain the rest. In the case of credit differences between GC and SC in 
2005, differences in consumption explain around 37 percent; differences in the source of the 
loan, purpose of the loan and occupations explain 23 percent, and differences in states 
contribute to 20 percent and differences in years of education, age and house quality explain 
the rest.   
In 2011, 26 percent of the explained portion of the total credit differences between GC 
and OBC is due to the differences in the level of consumption; differences in states 
contributes to 12 percent and differences in source of the loan, purpose of the loan and 
occupations contribute to 37 percent; and differences in age, house quality and education 
years explain the rest. Similarly, 44 percent of the explained portion of the credit differences 
between GC and ST in 2005 arise from the differences in consumption expenditure; source of 
the loan, purpose of the loan and occupations explain 15 percent; differences in states 
contributes to 18 percent and differences in years of education, age and quality of the house 
explain the rest. In the case of credit differences between GC and SC in 2011, differences in 
consumption explain around 37 percent; differences in the source of the loan, purpose of the 
loan and occupations explain 26 percent, and differences in states contribute to 14 percent 
and differences in years of education, age and house quality explain the rest.   
Differences in states explain a very significant portion of the credit gap15. Further 
investigating the variations in states, I find that states with a significant population of OBC 
and ST (such as Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Orrisa and Karnataka) increase the credit 
differences between GC and OBC and GC and ST. I also find that living in states such as 
Himachal Pradesh, West Bengal, Kerala, Punjab and Maharashtra reduces the credit 
differences between caste. Overall, the characteristics disparity between the general castes 
 
15 See Tables 1 and 2 in the online appendix. 
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and lower castes are largely due to differences in consumption, location (state), years of 
education, house quality, source of the loan, purpose of the loan, and occupations. 
e. Quantile decomposition 
In this section, I apply a quantile regression-based decomposition method proposed by Firpo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) to evaluate caste-based differences in the Indian credit sector16. 
Their methodology relies on an extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition which 
introduces a two-stage procedure; first, carry out the decomposition based on unconditional 
quantile regressions (UQR) techniques using a reweighting approach dividing the 
distributional changes into structure effect and a composition effect; second, the two 
components are further divided into the contribution of each explanatory variable using 
recentred influence function (RIF) regressions17.  
 
 Figures 4 and 5 (based on Tables 23 and 24 in the Appendix) report the quantile 
regression decompositions obtained for three quantiles (10th, 50th, and 90th). The quantile 
decomposition suggests that credit gaps between GC and OBC are higher at lower (10th) 
deciles compared to upper (90th) and middle (50th) deciles for both time period. The share of 
the unexplained component of the gap is also higher at the lower end of the credit 
distribution, demonstrating the evidence of sticky floor effect. This suggests that borrowers 
from the OBC group may be facing greater discrimination at the lower end of credit 
distribution. However, this effect reverses in the higher decile where borrowers from lower 
castes experience negative discrimination – credit markets favours OBC at the higher end of 
the distribution. 
The credit differences between GC and ST are higher at lower and middle deciles in 
2005. The unexplained component of the gap is also higher at the lower and middle deciles 
suggesting sticky floor effect. However, this effect reverses in 2011-12, where the credit 
differences and the unexplained gap are higher at the higher quantile. The credit differences 
between GC and SC and unexplained component is higher at higher quantile in 2005 
suggesting a glass ceiling effect. However, this effect reverses in 2011-12, where the credit 
differences and unexplained component is higher at lower deciles suggesting a sticky floor 
effect.  
 
16 I used the Stata program rifreg to estimate the unconditional quantiles. The programme can be downloaded 
from here: http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/datahead.html. 
17 The Firpo et al. method allows us to decompose the caste gap into the contribution of each individual 




In 2011, sticky floor effect for prevails for OBC and SC borrowers suggesting that the 
credit market only favours them at the higher end of the distribution. After correcting for 
selection, we see that the credit differences and the unexplained component reduced at upper 
quantiles implying that OBC and SC borrowers at higher quantiles who self-selected in the 
credit market got a better return for their characteristics. These borrowers at the upper end of 
the distribution are more likely to possess higher levels of entrepreneurial ability, 
perseverance and drive which improve their creditworthiness. They are also aware of their 
rights and might be in a better position to take action against perceived discrimination. 
Lenders aware of these possibilities may not be able to discriminate at the upper end of credit 
distribution. Moreover, the credit market at the higher end would be far more structured and 
rigidly defined, making it harder to discriminate across caste. Glass ceiling effect for the ST 
borrowers in 2011 suggest that borrowers from this caste group may face higher 
discrimination at the higher end of the distribution. In 2005, we see sticky floor effect for 
OBC and ST borrowers and glass ceiling effect for SC borrowers.  
 
It is generally very difficult to disentangle taste-based discrimination and statistical 
discrimination. Both kinds of discrimination can easily coexist in the credit market. The 
quantile decomposition shows significant variations in the unexplained component across the 
distribution. This suggests that a statistical discrimination effect prevails. If the 
discrimination was largely due to taste, it would have been constant across the entire credit 
distribution.  
 
A possible reason for the sticky floor effect for OBC and SC borrowers in 2011 and 
OBC and ST borrowers in 2005 could be due to the statistical discrimination practised in the 
credit market. In India, division of labour according to the caste system has frequently 
prevented individuals from starting businesses (Iyer, Khanna, Varshney, 2013) and hence, the 
lack of business experience at the lower end of credit distribution hurts their credit prospects. 
Even when Dalits become entrepreneurs, their businesses could suffer due to discrimination 
present in most domestic markets and the lack of suitable social and business networks. 
Because of this, lower castes are perceived as less creditworthy and riskier to lend to than 
upper castes. As a lower caste borrower moves up the economic ladder, lenders are less like 





Figure 4: Quantile decomposition of log of loan amount for 2011-12. The figure plots the result from quantile 




Figure 5: Quantile decomposition of log of loan amount 2005. The figure plots the result from quantile 
regression decompositions obtained at 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile. 
 
 25 
f. Decomposing credit outcomes differences by lenders: 
Since we have data regarding loan applications and approvals from various sources in the 
IHDS (II) 2011-12 survey data, we are able to decompose the caste differences in the 
probability of loan application and approval from banks, moneylenders, and social networks. 
The decomposition analysis reveals that GC has a lower probability of applying but a higher 
approval rate on their loan application in lending from banks compared to OBC (Panel A, 
Table 17 in the Appendix). However, GC has a higher probability of applying and approval 
rate in lending from the bank compared to SC and ST (Panel A, Table 17 in the Appendix). 
Contrary to that, all lower castes have a higher probability of applying and approval in 
lending from money lenders (Panel B, Table 17 in the Appendix). In lending from social 
networks, OBC and SC have a higher probability of applying but lower probability of 
approval compared to GC, whereas GC has a higher probability and approval compared to ST 
(Panel C, Table 17 in the Appendix).  
In the following subsection, I  will decompose the credit amount differences between castes 
in lending from banks, moneylenders and social networks.  
Banks: Banks are one of the major sources of credit for Indian borrowers. 27 percent and 32 
percent of all the borrowers in the sample in 2005 and 2011, respectively, took their loan 
from banks (see Table 13 in the Appendix). With the development of the banking system in 
India in the last decade, all the caste groups have increased their lending from banks. Figure 6 
(based on Table 18 in the Appendix) shows that there are large credit differentials between 
the general caste and lower castes. However, the credit differentials between GC and OBC 
have increased, whereas the credit differentials between GC and SC and GC and ST have 
decreased over the period considered. The share of the unexplained portion of the total 
differences between GC and lower castes have increased from 2005. A large portion of the 
differences between GC and SC remains unexplained suggesting that banks may be 





Figure 6: Adjusted credit differentials between castes in 2005 and 2011-12 in credit taken from banks.  
 
One ST borrower described the process of bank lending as humiliating: 
“…they (the bank) keep sending back our documents for the loan. While the loan officer 
collects the documents for the Jaats (upper caste) from their houses, we are not even allowed 
to sit on the chairs in the bank or offered any help to fill the complicated forms. While they 
photocopy the documents of upper castes in the bank, we are asked to get the photocopies 
from outside” 
One female Dalit interviewee said: 
“….even though my documents were complete, I was asked to sweep the bank floor in return 
for opening a bank account. This was despite the bank having a cleaning staff. This is 
degrading…” 
Some of the credit differences between castes in banking lending could also arise from 
repayment enforceability of the financial contract (as shown by Rubin and Kuran, 2018). 
Successive Indian governments have passed reforms to ensure a substantial flow of credit to 
SC/ST for self-employment at concessional interest rates through priority lending and other 
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special banking schemes. In some cases, loans to SC and ST entrepreneurs are given interest-
free18 and waiving the loan all together is in the process19. Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
updated its guidelines on credit facilities to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in 2016 
giving extra support to these communities in the formal banking sector20. However, schemes 
like these may have made the lower caste borrower riskier to lend to and less profitable. In 
this setting where lending is biased in favour of SC/ST, banks may resort to minimising the 
risk by giving less amount of loans to these communities, imposing an intended cost on them. 
Hence, these large credit differences may be echoing inherent conflict between allowing the 
banking system to be driven by market forces and expecting greater inclusion from the 
system. 
In the absence of credit history or information regarding borrowers’ creditworthiness, 
the unexplained gap is more likely to be due to statistical discrimination21. In such cases, 
banks may be holding lower caste loan applications to higher standards of creditworthiness 
than upper castes. For example, lower caste borrowers are more likely to come from poor 
areas with a higher risk of default leading a bank loan officer to grade their loan application 
strictly. When a substantial part of statistical discrimination is influenced by profit-
maximising actors, market forces are less likely to eliminate it. 
Our qualitative enquiries suggest that bank loan officers (largely belonging to general 
caste as observed by Fisman, Paravisini, and Rig, 2017) provide more assistance to higher 
caste borrowers in loan applications engaging in a subtle form of statistical discrimination, 
referred to as the “thick file” phenomenon. This means that the loan application file of a 
marginal higher caste borrower us more likely to be thicker with extra documents than those 
of a marginal lower caste borrower. The idea here is that upper caste loan officers may have 
 
18 Under Chief Minister Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Entrepreneur Scheme, Bihar government will 
provide interest free loans to eligible entrepreneurs from scheduled caste and scheduled tribes category.  
19 In the state of Karnataka, the state president has requested to the state government to waive education loans of 
the SC/ST students. 
20 Under new recommendations, banks are responsible for increasing awareness about new credit facilities 
among SC/ST borrowers and helping the borrowers in filling out forms and completing other formalities. Loan 
proposals from these communities are encouraged to be considered with utmost sympathy and understanding. 
To ensure these policies are followed, a special department has been set up for monitoring the flow of credit to 
SC/ST beneficiaries. Under the same guidelines, the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India has 
launched Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana-National Rural Livelihood Mission (DAY-NRLM), which would seek 
to ensure adequate coverage of vulnerable sections of the society such that 50% of these beneficiaries are 
SC/ST. Under Differential Rate of Interest Scheme, banks will provide finance up to Rs 15,000 at a 
concessionary rate of interest of 4 percent per annum to the lower castes for engaging in productive and gainful 
activities. 
21 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004)  show that more information regarding minority applicants’ skills does not 
always reduce discrimination in the labour market. 
 
 28 
less cultural affinities with and less knowledge of lower caste applicants. They are more 
likely to be strict with lower caste applications, relying on the group characteristics rather 
than investing resources in gathering more information on the creditworthiness of lower caste 
borrowers. In such a situation, extra documentation providing mitigating information could 
positively affect the credit outcome of marginal upper caste applications. Although this 
phenomenon has some credibility, further investigation is needed to documents its relevance 
and occurrence. 
Money lenders: Although the share of money lenders has reduced significantly over this time, 
they still play a major role in financing lower caste borrowers (see Table 13 in the Appendix). 
However, Figure 7 (based on Table 19 in the Appendix) shows that there are large credit 
differentials between the general caste and other lower castes, and a significant portion of the 
gap is unexplained. The credit differences have actually increased between 2005 and 2011-
12. Since money lenders provide credit to people in regions where formal finance has not 
reached; or to borrowers who are not creditworthy for banks and MFIs, the increase in the 
credit differentials and unexplained component is worrying. 
 
 




The qualitative interviews confirm the discriminatory attitude practised by informal money 
lenders towards lower castes.  
One respondent said: 
“… my local money lender always says that people from my caste cannot be trusted, even 
though I have never defaulted on a loan in my life. The conditions they set are always 
discriminatory. Upper caste lenders think that if they give loans to lower castes, we might 
become rich and less dependent on them.” 
 
One Dalit entrepreneur said:  
“The bayaj (interest rate) varies depending on your caste. Dalits are also expected to offer 
collateral (security) far in excess of the loan amount, and far in excess of other castes”.   
 
These informal money lenders, generally belonging to upper castes, have historically been 
the main source of financial credit for lower castes. In this sector of the credit market, 
discrimination is frequently overt and extreme. The informal lender I interviewed didn’t 
dispute the fact that they discriminate, and based their arguments on old-fashioned prejudice.  
 
One money lender feared loss of face in dealing with lower castes:  
“…….if a Dalit dared to default on my loan, people would laugh at me ” 
 
Another questioned the whole idea of Dalit entrepreneurs:  
“…if they all have businesses, who will work in our fields or clean our toilets?” 
 
In informal lending, money lenders can force repayments through panchayats (village 
councils usually consist of upper caste men whose verdicts are largely partial to the money 
lenders) or by keeping the collateral given as a security for the credit. Therefore, the approval 
rate of lower caste is higher than general caste in lending from money lenders. Logically, the 
credit differentials between general and other lower castes and the unexplained portion of 
these differentials should be lower since lower castes are less risky, however, this is not the 
case here. Moneylenders are sometimes the last resort of credit for poor and lower caste 
households. The qualitative enquiries suggest the informal lenders practice an extreme form 
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of discrimination against lower caste and are reluctant to fund lower caste entrepreneurs. 
Hence, low risk of giving credit to lower caste reduces the credit differences, while 
discrimination practised by moneylenders increases it. The results suggest that the latter 
effect prevails. 
The qualitative enquiries also suggest that taste-based discrimination is more likely to 
be present in lending from money lenders. In the case of better information regarding the 
borrower's creditworthiness, as usually in informal lending, the unexplained or discriminatory 
component in the total gap is more likely to be due to taste-based discrimination. Berkovec et 
al (1994) suggest that taste-based discrimination is likely to be higher when the lenders have 
higher market power. 
 
Social networks such as friends and relatives: Credit in the informal sector is highly 
segmented, and is based around people of the same caste, religion and kinship (Gupta and 
Mitra 2002). Hence, poor and lower castes are significantly disadvantaged due to a lack of 
networks, income, land, and education in obtaining loans from friends and relatives. The 
proportion of those taking loans from friends and relatives have marginally changed over the 
years. Figure 8 (based on Table 20 in the Appendix) shows that the credit differentials in 
lending from social networks such as friends and family have decreased significantly 






Figure 8: Adjusted credit differentials between castes by credit taken from friends and relatives 
However, these changes in credit differentials above are not easy to explain without 
significant additional research. The individual results from each year are perhaps easier to 
interpret: if lower caste borrowers seek credit from lower caste friends, while general caste 
borrowers seek credit from general caste friends, then it is logical that there would be a wide 
differential in the availability and ease of credit – in this scenario, the general caste ‘lenders’ 
simply have more credit available to give. It is, though, difficult to explain why this 
differential has changed so dramatically over the time period unless the overall level of 
wealth within the pool of lower caste lenders has increased at a greater rate than that of their 
general caste equivalents – and there is little evidence to suggest that this is the case.  This 
could also be due to the lower caste abandoning formal channels of finance because of the 
poor treatment and discouragement, thereby increasing their reliance on their own caste.  
 
In terms of this study, however, the reasons for the change are not directly relevant. What 
is relevant is that this is the only category of lending in which both borrower and lender are 
likely to share the same caste, and it is also the only category which shows improvement in 
the credit differentials between the general caste and all three lower castes. Clearly, this 
represents a positive development, but it also indicates that caste-based discrimination may 
be a significant factor in driving the credit differentials in other types of lending. In other 
 
 32 
words, caste-based differences may be decreasing, but only if lower caste borrowers are 
borrowing from lower caste lenders.  
g. Decomposing credit differences by residence: 
 Figure 9 (based on Tables 21 and 22 in the Appendix) presents the caste differences in the 
credit amount by place of residence – urban and rural areas. There are stark differences 
between credit differentials in rural and urban areas. Compared to 2005, the credit differences 
between GC and other lower castes have increased in the urban area and decreased in the 
rural area. The credit differences between GC and OBC and GC and ST are larger in the rural 
compared to the urban area in 2005 while the credit differences between GC and other lower 
castes are higher in urban area in 2011. 
Figure 9: The figure compares credit inequalities between various caste in urban and rural areas in 2011-12 and 
2005. 
While caste may be losing its relevance in traditional custom in urban areas, caste 
differences and prejudices are being reinforced by high gaps in credit amount. The credit gap 
has increased over this time suggesting that situation of lower caste has actually worsened in 
urban areas. A greater proportion of the lower castes live in rural areas, and the credit 
differentials between upper castes and lower castes, although decreased over the years, are 
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overwhelmingly high. Successive Indian governments have failed to improve the village 
banking infrastructure in India. Even though 70 percent of India’s population lives in rural 
areas, they only have 37 percent of the total number of bank branches of the country (Reserve 
Bank of India, 2015). Thus, a significant proportion of rural households, especially lower 
castes, are still outside the formal fold of the banking system.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
The study of discrimination in economics is motivated both by the moral case for 
equality and the consequent loss of efficiency in the market. Advances in research methods 
and designs have produced a significant interest in the field which has generated new insights 
into the nature of discrimination. Guryan and Charles (2013) argue that a deeper 
understanding of the sources and causes of discrimination is needed in order to formulate 
policies to reduce its incidence and effects; however, in order to do this, it is first necessary to 
identify the nature and scale of discrimination clearly. That is the focus of our study.  
 
The empirical evidence in this paper suggests that caste is still a worryingly potent 
determinant of lending outcomes in India. There are substantial credit differences between 
the general caste and other lower castes and these differences have decreased over the years. 
A portion of the credit differences between general caste and other lower castes (specially 
SC) remains unexplained. Hence, it can be argued that the disparities between the loans 
granted to general castes and other lower castes in India are not only because lower castes 
possess less human and physical capital than general castes, but also because these groups 
may be facing extensive and persistent discrimination in the credit sector. I also find that the 
loan application and approval rates are higher for general caste in the formal sector whereas 
lower castes are generally more likely to participate and have a higher approval on their loans 
in informal sector. However, the differences in the amount of credit granted is still a cause of 
apprehension, and in some cases, the situation appears to be growing worse, not better. 
 
Using a quantile regression-based decomposition method I analysed the caste gap 
across the entire credit distribution. I found the evidence of sticky floor effect in lending to 
OBC (for both time period), ST (in 2005) and SC (in 2011-12), whereas glass ceiling effect 
prevails in lending to SC (in 2005) and ST (in 2011-12). It’s also important to note that there 
are large credit differentials between the general caste and lower castes in almost every 
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instance in question: this includes rural and urban areas, credit taken from banks, money 
lenders and social network. In many instances, the credit differentials have actually increased 
over the time period considered in this research. 
 
In attempting to explain the results, I recognise that the unexplained portion may 
include unmeasurable or unobservable characteristics, for instance, drive, determination or 
other attitudes which are likely to affect the credit outcomes and thus, it does not necessarily 
mean explicit discrimination against lower castes. It is worth noting that the analysis seeks to 
measure the effects of a social variable named ‘caste’ which is itself composed of a number 
of ill-defined and unquantifiable elements. For instance, lower castes may possess higher 
levels of unmeasured characteristics like perseverance and determination which improve their 
creditworthiness but display more traits such as humility and lowered expectations which 
limit their credit requests. Hence, the issue of the unexplained components including the 
effects of unobservable or unmeasurable characteristics is a standard limitation in the 
decomposition analysis. 
 
Altogether, the evidence is consistent that lower caste individuals are disadvantaged in 
the credit sector. Recognising this, the Indian government has launched various programmes 
to improve the provision of financial services to the lower castes. However, the government 
can only play a direct role in the formal sector. Since banks and other government 
programmes have become the major source of finance for borrowers in India, a broader 
intervention from the government is much needed. Furthermore, the differences  in credit 
amount sanctioned and loan approval rates between the general caste and other lower castes 
in lending from banks are high. Schemes to promote the economic empowerment of lower 
castes through finance have been implemented on a large scale since the 1990s, but if we take 
anything from the results in this research, they have not been very effective.  
 
A large endowments difference between social groups indicates that there is a need to 
promote educational and training opportunities for the lower castes. The government should 
also ensure that the disadvantaged sections of society get full participation in schooling, 
employment, health programmes to reduce pre-market discrimination. Policy-makers need to 
adopt a broader range of strategies to tackle the deep-seated and multi-faceted challenge of 
systemic discrimination. Initiatives need to include the improvement of financial literacy 
across lower castes, encouragement of positive discrimination, improving the functioning and 
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competitiveness of the financial sector, active monitoring of caste bias, and more focused 
social research into the causes and nature of caste discrimination. 
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8. Appendix: Tables 
Table 6: Primary income generating occupational activities of various caste by percentage 
 
2011-12 2005 
Occupational activities GC OBC ST SC GC OBC ST SC 
Cultivation 25.89 26.52 36.48 13.63 23.24 26.97 35 12.84 
Allied agriculture 0.77 1.27 0.85 0.63 1.02 0.98 0.44 0.76 
Agricultural wage labour 4.06 8.99 15.48 18.08 5.76 12.61 22 24.76 
Non-agricultural wage labour 12.51 23.38 22.87 33.82 10.81 17.7 17 28.45 
Artisan/Independent 1.58 1.91 0.8 1.35 5.26 8.01 2 4.9 
Petty shop/Small business 13.72 12.87 4.39 6.87 5.68 5.03 2.44 2.54 
Organized Trade/Business 2.4 1.32 0.41 0.4 9.02 5.58 2.06 2.92 
Salaried employment 26.67 15.81 14.69 18.45 28.56 16.25 15 17.38 
Other Professions 1.04 0.45 0.22 0.39 1.41 0.98 0.44 0.64 
Pension/Rent/Dividend 8.23 4.28 2.72 3.7 6.05 3.25 2.27 2.51 
Others 3.14 3.2 1.1 2.67 3.19 2.63 1.37 2.32 
 
Table 7: Purpose of the loan in 2011-2012 and 2005 
Purpose GC OBC ST SC Purpose GC OBC ST SC 
 2011-12  2005 
House 15.56 14.24 12.96 16.46 House 19 15.21 14.16 14.16 
Land* 1.97 1.53 1.45 1.05 Land* 1.21 0.94 0.52 0.52 
Marriage 13.92 17.07 18.68 19.76 Marriage 13.05 15.58 12.78 12.78 
Agriculture* 18.38 18.21 23.14 9.8 Agri/business* 35.13 32.88 33.33 33.33 
Business* 10.25 7.77 4.47 5.35 Consumption 8.38 12.29 18.05 18.05 
Consumption 13.16 13.8 16.6 15.65 Car/appliance 2.76 1.1 0.78 0.78 
Car/Jeep 3.34 1.22 1.01 0.95 Education* 2.88 2.44 1.81 1.81 
Two-wheeler 1.23 1.02 0.44 0.97 Medical 10.89 13.83 12.09 12.09 
Truck/Bus* 0.56 0.3 0.38 0.1 Other 6.69 5.73 6.48 6.48 
Educational* 5.61 4.91 3.77 4.69 
     
Medical Exp 12.21 15.71 13.77 19.76 
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Others 3.82 4.22 3.33 5.45 
     
* Loans for productive purposes 
 
Table 8: Source of the loan in 2011-12 and 2005 
Source GC OBC ST SC GC OBC ST SC 
 2011-12 2005 
Employer 2.36 2.06 2.45 3.64 2.00 1.65 1.81 1.91 
Money Lender 10.22 20.19 20.57 24.81 19.47 33.58 32.9 42.17 
Friend 10.91 10.3 11.19 11.71 8.86 9.13 13.21 10.32 
Relative 19.85 21.45 23.77 21.23 18.39 19.19 19.78 17.41 
Bank* 43.81 32.31 26.42 22.9 37.36 26.28 21.07 19.62 
NGO* 0.91 0.78 1.45 1.39 0.13 0.17 0.26 0.14 
Credit Group* 3.28 2.29 2.39 3.12 2.61 2.06 3.97 1.83 
Govt. Program* 1.02 0.48 0.38 0.64 1.44 0.8 1.64 1.12 
Self-help group* 3.45 6.04 6.92 7.83 9.76 7.15 5.35 5.49 
Kisan Credit* 2.06 2.53 2.58 0.85     
Prov Funds* 0.3 0.19 0.13 0.02     
Suppliers* 0.26 0.22 0.31 0.4     
Others 1.58 1.16 1.45 1.47     
* Loan from formal sources.  
 
Table 9: Application for loans from various sources 
  
All GC OBC SC ST 
Banks Didn't apply 75 75 72 81 82 
 
Rejected 3 3 3 3 4 
 
Approved 22 22 25 16 15 
Money Lenders Didn't apply 81.5 89 77.5 78 84 
 
Rejected 3.5 3.5 4 3 3 
 
Approved 15 8 18.5 19 13 
 Relative and friends Didn't apply 70.5 76.5 66.5 70 71.5 
 
Rejected 3.5 3.5 4 3.5 4 
 
Approved 26 20 29.5 26.5 24.5 
Note: Numbers in percentages 
 
Table 10: The marginal effect of participation in the credit market by various castes in 2005.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GC OBC ST SC 
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CONSUMPTION 0.105*** 0.142*** 0.170*** 0.155*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.011) 
AGE 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.006 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
AGESQ -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EDUCATION -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
LAND 0.065*** 0.080*** 0.070*** 0.104*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.025) (0.016) 
SEX  -0.054*** -0.060*** 0.010 -0.042** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.032) (0.020) 
URBAN RURAL -0.076*** -0.083*** -0.122*** -0.035** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.034) (0.017) 
HOUSE QUALITY -0.037*** -0.044*** 0.053** -0.009 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.026) (0.015) 
     
STATE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
OCCUPATIONAL 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES YES 
Observations 13,332 16,213 3,270 8,304 
Delta standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is 1 if 
the client has taken a loan or 0 otherwise. All predictors at their mean value. The independent 
variables are: log of consumption, age, sex of the head of the household, size of the household, 
number of education years completed by the head, log of amount of land, dummy whether the 
household has a ration card, dummy for quality of the house (good/bad), dummy whether household 
is in urban area, and various dummies for occupation and the state where the household is located. 
 
Table 11: The marginal effect of participation in the credit market by various castes in 2011-12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GC OBC ST SC 
     
CONSUMPTION 0.119*** 0.132*** 0.113*** 0.141*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.018) (0.010) 
AGE 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.021*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
AGESQ -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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EDUCATION -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.004 -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
LAND 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.092*** 0.062*** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.025) (0.016) 
SEX  -0.048*** -0.057*** -0.109*** -0.033* 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.029) (0.017) 
URBAN RURAL -0.083*** -0.093*** -0.024 -0.058*** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.035) (0.016) 
HOUSE QUALITY -0.034** -0.031*** 0.003 -0.035** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.026) (0.014) 
STATE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
OCCUPATIONAL 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 11,680 16,763 3,590 8,807 
Delta standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Same as Table 3 
 
Table 12: Probit model for 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GC OBC ST SC 
     
CONSUMPTION 0.304*** 0.358*** 0.482*** 0.397*** 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.050) (0.029) 
AGE 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.017 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) 
AGE SQ -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EDUCATION -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) 
LAND OWN 0.187*** 0.201*** 0.200*** 0.266*** 
 (0.040) (0.032) (0.071) (0.042) 
SEX HEAD -0.156*** -0.151*** 0.027 -0.108** 
 (0.044) (0.038) (0.092) (0.052) 
URBAN -0.218*** -0.209*** -0.348*** -0.091** 
 (0.037) (0.030) (0.096) (0.043) 
HOUSE QUALITY -0.107*** -0.112*** 0.151** -0.023 
 (0.034) (0.028) (0.073) (0.038) 
STATE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
OCCUPATIONAL 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES YES 
Constant -3.673*** -3.047*** -4.932*** -3.314*** 
 (0.517) (0.276) (0.629) (0.501) 
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Observations 13,332 16,213 3,270 8,304 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is 1 if the client 
has taken a loan or 0 otherwise. The independent variables are: log of consumption, age, sex of the head of the 
household, size of the household, number of education years completed by the head, log of amount of land, 
dummy whether the household has a ration card, dummy for quality of the house (good/bad), dummy whether 
household is in urban area, and various dummies for occupation and the state where the household is located. 
 
Table 13: Probit Model for 2011-12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GC OBC ST SC 
     
CONSUMPTION 0.301*** 0.345*** 0.290*** 0.360*** 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.046) (0.027) 
AGE 0.024*** 0.034*** 0.053*** 0.032*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) 
AGE SQ -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EDUCATION -0.022*** -0.023*** 0.010 -0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) 
LAND OWN 0.198*** 0.203*** 0.235*** 0.157*** 
 (0.038) (0.030) (0.064) (0.040) 
SEX HEAD -0.122*** -0.148*** -0.279*** -0.084* 
 (0.039) (0.033) (0.074) (0.043) 
URBAN -0.208*** -0.242*** -0.062 -0.147*** 
 (0.037) (0.029) (0.090) (0.040) 
HOUSE QUALITY -0.087** -0.080*** 0.007 -0.090** 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.066) (0.035) 
STATE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
OCCUPATIONAL 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES YES 
 Constant -3.872*** -3.393*** -3.306*** -4.127*** 
 (0.862) (0.267) (0.605) (0.503) 
     
Observations 11,680 16,763 3,590 8,807 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Same as Table 15. 
 
Table 14: Selection corrected loan amount equation estimates for 2005  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GC OBC ST SC 
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CONSUMPTION 0.684*** 0.848*** 1.257*** 0.318* 
 (0.152) (0.129) (0.331) (0.177) 
AGE -0.022** -0.038*** -0.014 0.026** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.018) (0.011) 
AGESQ 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EDUCATION  0.047*** 0.041*** 0.026** 0.037*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006) 
LAND UNIT -0.084*** -0.063*** -0.082* -0.031 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.042) (0.024) 
SEX  0.322*** 0.486*** 0.277** 0.183*** 
 (0.067) (0.050) (0.138) (0.071) 
URBAN 0.454*** 0.291*** 0.056 0.338*** 
 (0.060) (0.047) (0.189) (0.057) 
HOUSE QUALITY 0.198*** 0.188*** -0.042 0.176*** 
 (0.058) (0.042) (0.116) (0.058) 
MILLS -2.589*** -2.414*** -1.837*** -2.095*** 
 (0.136) (0.101) (0.206) (0.125) 
Constant 6.948*** 2.913* -5.794 9.958*** 
 (1.687) (1.491) (3.792) (1.949) 
     
LOAN PURPOSE YES YES YES YES 
LOAN SOURCE YES YES YES YES 
OCCUPATIONAL 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES YES 
STATE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,444 7,633 1,156 3,661 
R-squared 0.511 0.460 0.628 0.496 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic) 
164.83 261.90 48.76 114.99 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the 
log of amount of loan. The independent variables are age, age square, number of education years 
completed, unit of land owned, predicted values of the first stage regression replacing the original 
value of log of consumption, and various dummies for loan source, its purpose and the state where the 





Table 15: Selection corrected loan amount equation estimates for 2011-12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GC OBC ST SC 
     
CONSUMPTION 0.809*** 0.484*** -0.225 0.528*** 
 (0.160) (0.102) (0.500) (0.148) 
AGE -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.074*** -0.044*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.025) (0.009) 
AGESQ 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EDUCATION  0.050*** 0.044*** 0.013 0.028*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.013) (0.005) 
LAND UNIT -0.085*** -0.034*** -0.059** -0.055*** 
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.026) (0.017) 
SEX  0.381*** 0.372*** 0.453*** 0.295*** 
 (0.053) (0.038) (0.120) (0.056) 
URBAN 0.483*** 0.468*** 0.519*** 0.223*** 
 (0.055) (0.036) (0.157) (0.052) 
HOUSE QUALITY 0.206*** 0.267*** 0.342*** 0.257*** 
 (0.053) (0.037) (0.115) (0.043) 
MILLS -3.273*** -3.121*** -3.050*** -3.012*** 
 (0.140) (0.103) (0.287) (0.134) 
Constant 3.688** 8.339*** 17.829*** 7.108*** 
 (1.870) (1.319) (5.562) (1.634) 
LOAN SOURCE 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES YES 
LOAN PURPOSE 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES YES 
OCCUPATIONAL 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES YES 
STATE DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,316 10,012 1,571 4,952 
R-squared 0.447 0.47 0.630 0.473 
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 158.20 333.48 167.50 166.17 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Same as Table 6 
 
Table 16: Decomposition of the log of credit amount differential for a selection corrected equation in 
2005 and 2011-12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





CONSUMPTION 0.249*** 0.592*** 0.353*** 0.190*** 0.554*** 0.292*** 
 (0.027) (0.077) (0.047) (0.019) (0.070) (0.036) 
AGE -0.038*** -0.037 0.002 -0.091*** -0.119*** -0.117*** 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.022) (0.014) (0.027) (0.024) 
AGE SQ 0.048*** 0.074*** 0.029 0.112*** 0.140*** 0.154*** 
 (0.012) (0.026) (0.021) (0.016) (0.028) (0.024) 
EDUCATION  0.081*** 0.162*** 0.109*** 0.074*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 
(0.007) (0.019) (0.012) (0.006) (0.015) (0.010) 
LAND UNIT -0.008*** 0.004 -0.023*** -0.007*** 0.003 -0.034*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) 
URBANRURAL 0.027*** 0.094*** 0.037*** 0.025*** 0.073*** 0.027*** 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) 
SEX -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
HOUSE QUALITY 0.022*** 0.059*** 0.028*** 0.017*** 0.060*** 0.040*** 
 (0.004) (0.018) (0.009) (0.003) (0.016) (0.006) 
PURPOSE OF LOAN 0.028*** 0.050*** 0.041*** 0.015*** 0.024*** -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) 
SOURCE OF LOAN 0.061*** 0.113*** 0.102*** 0.051*** 0.115*** 0.143*** 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) 
OCCUPATION 0.065*** 0.116*** 0.079*** 0.063*** 0.050*** 0.067*** 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.014) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012) 
STATES 0.342*** 0.178*** 0.194*** 0.275*** 0.233*** 0.113*** 
 (0.023) (0.035) (0.019) (0.017) (0.030) (0.015) 
Observations 12,077 5,600 8,105 15349 6897 10,283 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table decomposes the 
explained component from the equation 3 to identify the contribution of each specific characteristic in 
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generating credit differences. 
 
Table 17: Decomposition of loan application and loan approval rates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC 
 Loan application rate Loan approval rate 
Panel A: Banks       
GC 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Others 0.274*** 0.187*** 0.192*** 0.937*** 0.909*** 0.898*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) 
Difference -0.017*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.026*** 0.054*** 0.065*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.008) 
Explained -0.015*** 0.044*** 0.069*** 0.020*** 0.030*** 0.050*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) 
Unexplained -0.002 0.026** -0.003 0.006 0.024* 0.015 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.009) 
Observations 27,988 15,050 20,240 7,256 3,431 4,421 
Panel B: Money 
Lenders 
      
GC 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.806*** 0.806*** 0.806*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Others 0.223*** 0.164*** 0.221*** 0.878*** 0.894*** 0.900*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) 
Difference -0.111*** -0.052*** -0.109*** -0.072*** -0.088*** -0.095*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) 
Explained -0.088*** -0.036*** -0.063*** -0.048*** -0.107*** -0.066*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.016) (0.010) 
Unexplained -0.023*** -0.016* -0.047*** -0.024* 0.019 -0.029* 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.020) (0.015) 
Observations 27,988 15,050 20,240 4,655 1,670 2,991 
Panel B: Social 
Networks 
      
GC 0.233*** 0.233*** 0.233*** 0.926*** 0.926*** 0.926*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Others 0.336*** 0.287*** 0.302*** 0.922*** 0.940*** 0.925*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
Difference -0.102*** -0.053*** -0.068*** 0.004 -0.014 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Explained -0.073*** -0.061*** -0.056*** 0.002 -0.022*** -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
Unexplained -0.029*** 0.008 -0.012* 0.002 0.008 0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) 
Observations 27,988 15,050 20,240 7,883 3,457 5,070 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is 1 if applied for 
a loan at a bank, from money lender or in social network, 0 otherwise (Columns 1-3). The independent variable 
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is 1 if approved by bank, money lender or in social network (Columns 4-6). The dependent variables are same 
as used in selection model. 
 
 
Table 18: Adjusted differences between castes by banks 
 2005 2011 
VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC 
       
GC 12.918*** 12.918*** 12.918*** 13.674*** 13.674*** 13.674*** 
 (0.205) (0.205) (0.205) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) 
Others 12.097*** 11.328*** 11.344*** 12.686*** 12.481*** 12.177*** 
 (0.133) (0.341) (0.219) (0.096) (0.424) (0.165) 
Difference 0.820*** 1.590*** 1.574*** 0.988*** 1.193*** 1.497*** 
 (0.244) (0.398) (0.300) (0.187) (0.453) (0.230) 
Explained 0.794*** 1.401*** 0.802*** 0.710*** 0.960*** 0.702*** 
 (0.050) (0.119) (0.062) (0.038) (0.084) (0.048) 
Unexplained 0.027 0.189 0.772*** 0.278 0.232 0.795*** 
 (0.239) (0.391) (0.296) (0.183) (0.449) (0.228) 
       
Observations 3,664 1,900 2,377 5,541 2,743 3,460 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the 
decomposition results corrected for selection and endogeneity for sample of borrowers from banks. 
 
Table 19: Credit differences between castes by money lenders 
 2005 2011 
VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC 
       
GC 11.553*** 11.553*** 11.553*** 12.752*** 12.752*** 12.752*** 
 (0.254) (0.254) (0.254) (0.317) (0.317) (0.317) 
Others 10.893*** 9.930*** 10.478*** 11.947*** 11.024*** 11.667*** 
 (0.126) (0.303) (0.140) (0.128) (0.373) (0.166) 
Difference 0.660** 1.623*** 1.076*** 0.805** 1.728*** 1.084*** 
 (0.284) (0.395) (0.290) (0.342) (0.490) (0.358) 
Explained 0.465*** 0.778*** 0.413*** 0.457*** 1.068*** 0.487*** 
 (0.052) (0.083) (0.050) (0.058) (0.106) (0.062) 
Unexplained 0.195 0.845** 0.663** 0.348 0.659 0.597* 
 (0.282) (0.394) (0.287) (0.340) (0.487) (0.354) 
       
Observations 3,430 1,246 2,409 2,579 871 1,775 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the 





Table 20: Credit differences in social networks 
 2005 2011 
VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC 
       
GC 11.933*** 11.933*** 11.933*** 12.699*** 12.699*** 12.699*** 
 (0.236) (0.236) (0.236) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) 
Others 10.899*** 9.536*** 10.362*** 11.886*** 11.635*** 11.714*** 
 (0.148) (0.274) (0.175) (0.115) (0.348) (0.157) 
Difference 1.034*** 2.397*** 1.571*** 0.812*** 1.064*** 0.985*** 
 (0.279) (0.362) (0.294) (0.237) (0.405) (0.260) 
Explained 0.696*** 1.312*** 0.766*** 0.489*** 1.302*** 0.443*** 
 (0.050) (0.101) (0.054) (0.043) (0.085) (0.043) 
Unexplained 0.338 1.085*** 0.805*** 0.323 -0.238 0.542** 
 (0.277) (0.360) (0.292) (0.235) (0.403) (0.258) 
       
Observations 3,374 1,594 2,228 4,836 2,186 3,272 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the 
decomposition results corrected for selection and endogeneity for sample of borrowers from social 
networks. 
 
Table 21: Adjusted credit differential between castes in urban areas. 
 2005 2011 
VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC 
       
GC 13.225*** 13.225*** 13.225*** 14.493*** 14.493*** 14.493*** 
 (0.250) (0.250) (0.250) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) 
Others 12.656*** 12.068*** 11.306*** 13.336*** 12.280*** 12.490*** 
 (0.187) (0.651) (0.205) (0.156) (0.596) (0.166) 
Difference 0.569* 1.157* 1.919*** 1.157*** 2.213*** 2.004*** 
 (0.313) (0.698) (0.323) (0.277) (0.639) (0.283) 
Explained 0.949*** 0.204 0.861*** 0.712*** 0.338** 0.646*** 
 (0.061) (0.179) (0.063) (0.054) (0.136) (0.052) 
Unexplained -0.380 0.953 1.059*** 0.445 1.875*** 1.358*** 
 (0.306) (0.680) (0.315) (0.274) (0.626) (0.277) 
       
Observations 3,815 1,754 2,534 4,877 2,082 3,213 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the 





Table 22: Adjusted credit differential between castes in rural areas. 
 2005 2011 
VARIABLES GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC GC vs OBC GC vs ST GC vs SC 
       
GC 11.970*** 11.970*** 11.970*** 12.549*** 12.549*** 12.549*** 
 (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) 
Others 10.812*** 10.036*** 10.426*** 11.647*** 11.481*** 11.468*** 
 (0.076) (0.192) (0.105) (0.058) (0.191) (0.093) 
Difference 1.158*** 1.934*** 1.544*** 0.901*** 1.068*** 1.081*** 
 (0.156) (0.235) (0.172) (0.131) (0.224) (0.149) 
Explained 0.697*** 1.170*** 0.787*** 0.639*** 1.083*** 0.701*** 
 (0.033) (0.062) (0.039) (0.028) (0.054) (0.034) 
Unexplained 0.461*** 0.765*** 0.757*** 0.262** -0.015 0.380** 
 (0.153) (0.234) (0.170) (0.129) (0.225) (0.150) 
       
Observations 8,262 3,845 5,571 10,472 4,805 7,068 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the 
decomposition results corrected for selection and endogeneity for sample of rural area only.
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Table 23: Quantile decomposition of log of loan amount for 2011-12 
VARIABLE GC VS OBC GC VS ST GC VS SC 
Percentiles 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
GC 11.467*** 12.471*** 12.961*** 14.552*** 15.385*** 11.467*** 12.471*** 12.961*** 14.552*** 15.385*** 11.467*** 12.471*** 12.961*** 14.552*** 15.385*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) (0.213) (0.173) (0.135) (0.205) (0.236) (0.213) (0.173) (0.135) (0.205) (0.236) 
Others 9.794*** 10.995*** 12.119*** 13.285*** 14.642*** 9.762*** 11.711*** 11.847*** 12.220*** 13.455*** 9.824*** 10.430*** 11.589*** 12.649*** 14.001*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.428) (0.342) (0.267) (0.320) (0.425) (0.111) (0.089) (0.101) (0.118) (0.198) 
Difference 1.673*** 1.476*** 0.842*** 1.267*** 0.743*** 1.704*** 0.760** 1.114*** 2.332*** 1.930*** 1.643*** 2.041*** 1.373*** 1.904*** 1.384*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.478) (0.383) (0.299) (0.380) (0.486) (0.240) (0.195) (0.168) (0.236) (0.308) 
Explained 0.384*** 0.581*** 0.659*** 0.937*** 0.997*** 0.925*** 1.109*** 1.193*** 1.532*** 1.369*** 0.547*** 0.679*** 0.698*** 0.891*** 1.003*** 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.081) (0.070) (0.056) (0.074) (0.096) (0.037) (0.034) (0.031) (0.039) (0.049) 
Unexplained 1.289*** 0.895*** 0.183*** 0.330*** -0.255*** 0.779 -0.350 -0.079 0.801** 0.561 1.096*** 1.361*** 0.674*** 1.012*** 0.381 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.484) (0.385) (0.299) (0.379) (0.492) (0.237) (0.194) (0.168) (0.232) (0.307) 
                
Observation 15,361 15,361 15,361 15,361 15,361 6,904 6,904 6,904 6,904 6,904 10,295 10,295 10,295 10,295 10,295 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the result from quantile regression decompositions of log of loan amount obtained at 
















Table 24: Quantile decomposition of log of loan amount for 2005 
VARIABLE GC VS OBC GC VS ST GC VS SC 
Percentiles 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
GC 10.264*** 10.93*** 12.086*** 13.425*** 14.628*** 10.264*** 10.92*** 12.086*** 13.425*** 14.628*** 10.264*** 10.93*** 12.086*** 13.425*** 14.62*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.024) (0.029) (0.202) (0.135) (0.150) (0.188) (0.355) (0.202) (0.135) (0.150) (0.188) (0.355) 
Others 9.318*** 9.682*** 11.607*** 12.730*** 13.752*** 7.891*** 9.162*** 10.157*** 11.502*** 13.254*** 8.884*** 9.681*** 10.487*** 11.559*** 12.720*** 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.367) (0.276) (0.212) (0.340) (0.450) (0.154) (0.121) (0.109) (0.135) (0.206) 
Difference 0.947*** 1.250*** 0.478*** 0.695*** 0.875*** 2.374*** 1.770*** 1.929*** 1.923*** 1.374** 1.381*** 1.251*** 1.599*** 1.866*** 1.907*** 
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.026) (0.029) (0.035) (0.419) (0.307) (0.259) (0.389) (0.573) (0.254) (0.182) (0.185) (0.231) (0.410) 
Explained 0.698*** 0.512*** 0.920*** 1.032*** 1.226*** 1.211*** 1.146*** 1.262*** 1.589*** 1.774*** 0.724*** 0.680*** 0.813*** 0.957*** 1.162*** 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.027) (0.029) (0.033) (0.091) (0.065) (0.059) (0.077) (0.124) (0.041) (0.032) (0.032) (0.039) (0.060) 
Unexplained 0.249*** 0.739*** -0.442*** -0.337*** -0.351*** 1.162*** 0.623** 0.666** 0.334 -0.401 0.657*** 0.571*** 0.786*** 0.909*** 0.745* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.422) (0.308) (0.259) (0.393) (0.582) (0.254) (0.182) (0.184) (0.229) (0.404) 
                
Observation 12,081 12,081 12,081 12,081 12,081 5,602 5,602 5,602 5,602 5,602 8,108 8,108 8,108 8,108 8,108 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the result from quantile regression decompositions of log of loan amount obtained at 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 
and 90%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
